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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 46011-2018

)
)

V.

)

Bannock County Case No.
CR—2017-6895

)

JEREME TIMOTHY MAUCH,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

183$
Has Mauch

failed to establish that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by imposing an

underlying uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve years, with two years ﬁxed, upon his guilty plea t0 stalking in
the ﬁrst degree?

Mauch Has
The

Failed

state

enhancement.

To

Establish That

charged

Mauch With

(R., pp.37-40.)

The

District Court

Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

stalking in the ﬁrst degree, with a deadly

Mauch

pled guilty

weapon enhancement, and

the parties

Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement,

to stalking in the ﬁrst degree, the state dismissed the

weapon

stipulated that

Mauch be

retaining jurisdiction.”

sentenced “to a term as determined by the court, with the Court
Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court

(R., pp.99-102.)

imposed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve

years, With

two years ﬁxed, retained jurisdiction, and ran the

sentence concurrently with Mauch’s sentence for felony insufﬁcient funds checks in

County case CR-2013-2687.
district court

(R., pp.1

relinquished jurisdiction.

1

1-14.)

jurisdiction.

reduction 0f his sentence.

(R., pp.135-36.)

Mauch’s Rule 35 motion by suspending

(Aug,

years.

Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the

(R., pp.1 17-18.)

from the order relinquishing

Bannock

Mauch ﬁled

(R., pp.125-28.)

He

a notice 0f appeal timely

also ﬁled a

Following a hearing, the

his sentence

Rule 35 motion for

district court

granted

and placing him on probation for four

pp.1-5.)

Mauch

argues that his underlying sentence 0f ﬁve years, With two years ﬁxed,

is

excessive in light 0f “the nature 0f the offense, his character, and the protection 0f the public
interest.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)

Mauch

There are two reasons

why Mauch’s argument

fails.

First,

stipulated as part of the binding plea agreement t0 allow the district court t0 determine his

precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the

underlying sentence and, as such,

is

court’s sentencing determination

on appeal.

Mauch’s claims, he has

Second, even

if this

failed t0 establish that the district court

Court reviews the merits 0f

abused

its

discretion

by imposing

a uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve years, With two years ﬁxed.

A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error,
action 0f the

trial

court that the party invited, consented to 0r acquiesced in

Castrejon, 163 Idaho 19, 21,

(citations omitted).

trial.

Li.

from complaining

407 P.3d 606, 608

(Ct.

was

W

that a ruling or

error.

App. 2017) (review denied

Jan. 4,

2018)

This doctrine applies t0 sentencing decisions as well as t0 rulings during

The purpose of the

invited error doctrine

is t0

prevent a party

who

caused 0r played an

important role in prompting a

0n appeal.

Li. at 22,

trial

407 P.3d

at

court to take a certain action from later challenging that action

609

(citing State V. Blake, 133

Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117,

120 (1999)).

Mauch
As

part of that agreement,

would “be sentenced
(R., pp.99-102.)

sentence 0f

TL,

“.

.

(E R., pp.99-102.)

pled guilty pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement.

to a

Which Mauch signed, Mauch and the

At sentencing, consistent with the plea agreement, the

Mauch’s counsel acknowledged

that “the

state

The court “follow[ed]

the Rule 11 agreement,”

recommended a

two underlying.”

(1

1/13/17

Rule 11 says that the term would be

determined by the Court,” and “recommend[ed] a sentence of two and two.”
Ls. 14-17.)

Mauch

term as determined by the court, With the Court retaining jurisdiction.”

.retaining jurisdiction, running concurrent, three plus

p.9, Ls.4-5.)

state stipulated that

(1

1/13/17 Tr., p.10,

imposed a “two-year ﬁxed, three-year

indeterminate sentence,” retained jurisdiction, and ordered the sentence t0 run concurrently With

Mauch’s sentence
Ls.6-13.)

in

Bannock County case CR-2013-2687.

(11/13/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-4, p.14,

Although Mauch recommended a lesser sentence than the one the court ultimately

imposed, he speciﬁcally agreed as part 0f the plea agreement to “be sentenced t0 a term as
determined by the court.”

Having done

11/13/17 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-16.)

(R., p.101;

so,

he

is

precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the court’s sentencing determination on
appeal.

Even

if this

Court considers the merits of Mauch’s claim, he has

abuse of discretion.
entire length

When

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

still

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State

It is

presumed

that the

V.

an

excessive, the court considers the

of the sentence under an abuse 0f discretion standard. State

1, 8,

failed to establish

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

ﬁxed portion 0f

the sentence Will be the defendant’s probable term of

conﬁnement. State
is

V. Oliver,

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

of discretion.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

at 8,

368 P.3d

burden the appellant must show the sentence
Li.

A

sentence

is

reasonable if

it

The

Li.

differing weights

(citations omitted).

rehabilitation).

all

0f the related goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, or

deciding upon the sentence.

I_d.

at 9,

368 P.3d

at

629; State V. Moore,

discretion in concluding

its

0f punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for

“In deference to the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho

at

628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho

ﬁxed within
discretion

the limits prescribed

the trial court.”

by

carry this

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.

131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse
that the objectives

T0

has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them

district court

When

628

a clear abuse

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of

protecting society and to achieve any or

retribution.

is

at

it is

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

at

by

its

View of a
368 P.3d

at 8,

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of

Li. (quoting State V. Nice,

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

The maximum prison sentence
7905(4).

The

ﬁxed, Which

district court

falls

for stalking in the ﬁrst degree

within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.1

1

1-14.)

Mauch’s sentence

is

case, his disregard for the terms

On

years.

years, With

appeal,

I.C. § 18-

two years

Mauch

contends

because of “the nature of the offense, his character, and

the protection of the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)

that

ﬁve

imposed an underlying uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve

that his underlying sentence is excessive

show

is

However, these

factors

d0 not

excessive, particularly in light of his dangerous behavior in this

0f community supervision, and the danger he presents to society.

In this case, Mauch contacted his estranged wife, Danielle Upton, at her place of business
multiple times on May 22, 2017. (R., p.12.) One of Danielle’s co-workers contacted the
Pocatello Police Department “due to [Mauch’s] demeanor and actions.” (R., p.12.) When police
responded, Danielle reported that Mauch made five attempts to contact her and that he actually
entered the business three times, “causing verbal disturbances, while customers were also inside
the business.” (R., p.12.) The first time Mauch entered the business, he did so through an
unsecured back door and was standing behind Danielle without her knowledge until a co-worker
saw him. (R., p.12.) Danielle was able to get Mauch out of the business, at which point Mauch
“demanded money for fuel” because was “on the run with warrants,” and he threatened to “slit
his wrists” if Danielle did not give him the money. (R., p.12.) At the time he made the threat,
Mauch was “holding a knife and sharpening it with a file.” (R., p.12.) Mauch left but returned
to the business “two more times[,] causing further verbal disturbances.” (R., p.12.) The last time
Mauch came into the business, he told Danielle, “your [sic] a dead bitch.” (R., p.12.)
Danielle reported that she “lived in fear” not only for her safety but also for the safety of
her children.” (R., p.12.) She also reported that she had sent her three children to be with other
family members because Mauch had “been using methamphetamine and ha[d] extreme
paranoia.” (R., p.12.) Danielle’s co-worker also believed that Mauch was “under the influence
of a narcotic” at the time the incidents occurred. (R., p.12.) Mauch’s erratic and threatening
behavior justify the sentence imposed.
Mauch claims his underlying sentence is neither “reasonable considering his character”
nor “necessary to protect the public interest.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Mauch is incorrect.
Mauch’s character is that of an individual who is either unwilling or unable to conform his
behavior to the requirements of the law. His criminal history includes a prior felony conviction

5

for

drawing a check with insufﬁcient funds, for which Mauch was on probation when he

committed the offense

in this case.

misdemeanor convictions

(PSI, pp.3, 71; R., p.100.)

for alcoholic beverage

driving without privileges, and failure t0 stop at

He

record also includes

— possess/consume/purchase by
damage

a minor,

accident/leave scene, as well as a

telephone harassment charge that was dismissed 0n the motion of the prosecutor and a

DUI

charge that was dismissed following a Withheld judgment.

DUI

charge, the presentence investigator reported that

approved for

[the]

(PSI, pp.6-7.)

Mauch “was

DUI/Drug Court Program following

issued a Withheld judgement and subsequently the

Power County DUI/Drug Court Program.”

assessed

Mauch

committed

as a

at least

DUI

charge was dismissed,” but “[h]is

“Mauch

still

0we[]d $502.00

to

That same presentence investigator

two more crimes: possession 0f marijuana and the ﬁrst degree stalking charge
this case

Mauch’s dangerous actions

appropriate.

(PSI, p.7.)

He was

moderate risk t0 reoffend (PSI, p.10) but, since that time, Mauch has

0f Which he was convicted in

failure t0 abide

placed on probation and then

a couple of probation Violations.

withheld judgment was revoked on 03/02/2009” and, as of 2013,
the

Regarding the

by

(ﬂ R., p.100).

in this case While

the conditions of

on probation,

his criminal history,

community supervision demonstrate

Given any reasonable View of the

facts,

Mauch

and his

that his sentence is

has failed t0 establish an abuse 0f

discretion.

1

PSI page numbers correspond With the page numbers of the electronic ﬁle
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS MAUCH 4601 1.pdf”

“CONFIDENTIAL

m
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

1st

Court to afﬁrm Mauch’s conviction and sentence.

day 0f April, 2019.

/s/

Lori A. Fleming

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the attached
File and Serve:

that

I

have

this 1st

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

day 0f April, 2019, served a true and correct
below by means of iCourt

t0 the attorney listed

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/_Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

